Russian-Arab trade and economic relations have a long history, but over the past quarter-century they have passed through difficult tests, reaching a peak in the late 1980s and experiencing a deep decline in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently, they can get a chance to revive the former potential, which remained unclaimed, but is gradually being built up to take on a new form in the new geopolitical realities.

Keywords: economic relations, trade exchange, export potential, business activity, economic cooperation, competitiveness, project, economic space, capital deficit, oil and gas industry.

REMARKS ON THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF RUSSIA AND THE ARAB WORLD

Vladimir ISAEV, Aleksandr FILONIK

Russian-Arab trade and economic relations have a rather long history hut the last 25 years they have been marked by hard problems reaching a peak in the end of the 1980s and testing a deep fall-down in the 1990s after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Nowadays they may have chance to restore their potential that remained parked idle but now is under reconstruction in order to gain new forms in a new geopolitical reality.

Keywords: economic relations, trade exchange, export potential, business activity, economic cooperation, competitiveness, project, economic space, capital deficit, oil and gas industry.

There is no need to talk about the geopolitical significance of the Arab world as such. As well as the fact that most of the Arab countries have now "woken up", moving to a turbulent political life, and therefore for a long time left the track of normal development.

ISAEV Vladimir Aleksandrovich-Doctor of Economics, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor of the Institute of Asian and African Countries. v-isaev@yandex.ru;

FILONIK Alexander Oskarovich-Candidate of Economic Sciences, Leading Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. fao44@mail.ru.

Vladimir ISAEV - Doctor of Sciences (in Economy), Principal Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies. RAS; Professor, Institute of Asian and African Studies, v-isaev@yandex.ru;

Aleksandr FILONIK - PhD (in Economy), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, fao44@mail.ru.

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These two circumstances create a new environment for international trade and economic communication. Its main feature is that the natural process of exchange of goods, capital, and services has been seriously disrupted for a significant part of the region. Nevertheless, the resource advantages and other advantages, such as the large internal market and large population that the Arab East has, give reason to continue to consider it an attractive partner in trade and economic relations.1 These considerations also guide Russia, which hopes to expand its presence there and contribute to the development of the region.

This is not to say that almost everything will have to start from zero. During the heyday of Soviet-Arab friendship, economic ties were intense, although with a relatively small number of states that were considered ideologically close and required increased attention to their economic stability and defense capabilities. All contracts in that era were carried out exclusively through the state line and concerned mainly production and infrastructure facilities. Foreign trade remained the State's area of responsibility. The mechanisms of inter-State communication were well-established, and contractual and performance discipline was maintained at an acceptable level. Together with extensive assistance, this made it possible to create a corps of "agents of influence" in Arab trade and economic circles, whose opinions were listened to by the political leadership of partner countries. But that's not enough now.

Earlier restrictions in the form of non-economic and economic risks were less imperative, but now they have acquired new facets due to the aggravation of internal antagonisms in a number of significant subjects of international economic relations in the Arab world. There is no need to talk about their complete isolation from the global market, but the impossibility for all of them of a full-fledged representation on it is obvious. It is also clear that destructive trends are not limited to national borders. They also fuel internal tensions in neighboring countries, forcing them to react to the situation in their neighbors and question their foreign trade and economic ties with Arab countries due to well-defined risks and threats. Thus, the contact field can sometimes shrink and negatively affect the balance of cooperation. In other words, states that are "peripheral" in relation to countries that are involved in conflicts are expanding the zone of instability, where foreign economic activity is more or less uncomfortable.

Serious challenges to international economic relations are generated by various sources. First, in the current unstable situation, fears were justified that outwardly relatively prosperous Arab countries could easily turn into hotbeds of instability, becoming involved in conflicts of varying intensity based on interethnic differences, religious or tribal hostility. Secondly, when violence grows, conditions arise for widespread non-compliance and direct violation of order and legality, as a result of which economic activity suffers, traditional economic ties are disrupted, the domestic market collapses, business activity decreases, and as a result, export potential decreases. Third, direct armed clashes, loss of life, destruction of material values and productive forces undermine the very idea of economic cooperation with the international community. Productive exchange is hindered or tends to be minimized due to the death or flight of qualified personnel and workers, deterioration of working conditions, reproduction mechanisms, and the failure of production assets.

1 For more information, see for example: [Isaev, Philonik. 2015].

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for example, reducing domestic savings and reducing the ability to pay for imports.

The increased vulnerability of any project or business undertaking deprives any creative activity of prospects, since there are problems with the implementation of contracts, and the fulfillment of obligations is disrupted. Potential trade and economic partners naturally freeze decisions about moving to new sites, being wary of negative consequences for investment and material resources.

Another important point from an economic point of view (not necessarily caused by war or unrest) can be considered risks that are caused by law enforcement practices and techniques that do not agree with the generally accepted ones. In some Arab countries with unstable business and economic structures, this kind of phenomenon has also occurred in a more relaxed environment. In conflict situations, where there are many deficits and especially payment resources, the temptation to introduce informal methods in business can be very attractive for local practitioners in terms of exemption, at least partially, from the obligation to fulfill contracts in full. Moreover, the weakness of vertical ties and localism often contribute to the suppression of generally accepted mechanisms for resolving disputes.

At one time, almost all Arab countries declared their commitment to the policy of protecting foreign capital. The authorities have always been interested in attracting foreign investment and ensuring normal conditions for their functioning. Therefore, almost everywhere structural reforms were implemented in one form or another, economic activity was liberalized, public consumption was reduced, exports were diversified, and individual entrepreneurship and the private sector as such were encouraged. In general, a whole set of measures was taken to mobilize the economy and increase export potential, as well as to attract foreign investors with benefits and preferences as sources of financing, the latest technologies and trade partners-suppliers of modern goods and services.

The massive reformatting of socio-economic structures in the Arab East had many goals. In particular, to create conditions for the promotion of Western capital, which "typeset" the Arab world to meet its own standards. To homogenize the Arab economic space and accelerate the process of its integration into the global (i.e. Western) market in the course of increasing macroeconomic indicators. It is better to tie it more firmly to the world capitalist economy, not only economically, but also geopolitically. The drift in this direction has largely accelerated not only the economic but also the political dynamics in a large group of countries in the region, depriving, as it turned out, the Arab world of a peaceful prospect for the foreseeable future and creating new dividing lines within it, in addition to those that previously rigidly differentiated it by economic, resource, human and other indicators.

But even in the current circumstances, it is hardly advisable to consider the region and its states only as a single conflict enclave, which is completely excluded from the sphere of international trade communication. Where the struggle is fought on the periphery of specific countries in the region, such as in Sudan, and where relatively peaceful zones remain, foreign commercial activity is not particularly at risk. Despite the claims to the ruling regimes from the West about freedoms and civil rights, the capital of industrialized countries and new industrial giants is quite seriously represented here. He is actively working and shows no desire to give up the positions he has won.

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Even in the oil-producing states of open conflict (Libya, Iraq), foreign capital continues to intensively develop their hydrocarbon resources, generate financial flows, provide assistance, etc., using any excuse to promote their interests and expand their influence. It is not far behind China, which in recent decades has established itself in the Arab world very thoroughly and has serious interests in its oil and gas resources, capital and civil construction, in the agricultural sector and in other areas.

It is this practice that serves as a backdrop for Russia's penetration into the Arab economic space. And there is no need to talk about a breakthrough success for her in this field yet. The effectiveness of Russia's efforts to expand its economic presence does not give grounds to confidently outline the prospects for its entry into the rich and heterogeneous markets of the Arab East. This applies equally to its attempts to assert itself in both capital-deficient and capital-surplus States of the region.

The division between indicators of resource potential and, accordingly, indicators of well-being and financial support for development does not allow us to interpret the Arab world as a single whole. There are two poles in it, represented by oil importers and oil exporters, which requires different approaches to assessing the possibilities of cooperation with them.

Russia has recently taken regular steps to gain a foothold in various parts of the Arab economic space, to compensate for the withdrawal of twenty-five years ago from key sectors of ideologically and politically close countries during the Soviet period, in parallel with establishing relations with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. However, in the Arab oil importers, the former Soviet positions were occupied by competitors from stronger economic systems. And the USSR had practically no positions in the world of hydrocarbon exporters: there the market places were firmly occupied by rivals from the industrially developed countries of the West.

In such circumstances, Russia's entry into the Arab markets is difficult, if not blocked. This is reflected in the theoretically promising prospects for cooperation in those areas that have been revived over the past decade. But at the same time, if Russian capital was promoted to the Arab markets to one degree or another, the flow towards them was minimal, although foreign investment remained the main goal for Russia. Meanwhile, Arab oil importers operate in a capital deficit regime and are extremely interested in the inflow of funds from outside, so they are practically unable to act as investors. And exporters are not ready to invest widely in Russia, on the one hand, because of concerns about the experience gained and economic dynamics in Russia, and on the other, taking into account the traditionally cautious Western policy towards Russia, which they generally follow.

Large Russian state corporations or self-sufficient joint-stock companies are mainly involved in cooperation with Arab countries. They can act in various capacities and act as contractors and investors, participating in tenders for the production of certain types of work in the oil and gas sector or in infrastructure construction, financial transactions, investment projects or credit schemes. They operate under contracts at the interstate level and are involved in more or less large-scale projects. Their foreign economic activity (FEA) is subject to the established procedure, stipulated by the relevant agreements at the state level, which determine the technical parameters. However, the Russian economic elite in a number of aspects tends to approach the time of the state leadership of foreign economic activity, and this element of inertia hardly helps in a tough fight with Western counterparts.

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During the Soviet period, cooperation issues were resolved at the state level. They were largely bureaucratic on both sides and, in fact, only needed more or less qualified organizational and technical support, usually for large-scale transactions with pre-selected product groups or for projects whose parameters were pre-agreed and required mainly tracking of the corresponding deliveries and payments made on a planned basis.

With the transfer of the prerogatives of the former great power to the Russian Federation, the conditions of foreign economic activity have changed significantly, and not only in connection with the collapse of the Soviet system of centralized national economy. Changes have emerged both with the emergence of new trends in the camp of traditional competitors, and with the entry into the arena of new players in the global and regional economic space, who have global economic interests and considerable political ambitions, while being extremely assertive in conducting trade and economic operations.

Russia opened up to cooperation with the Arab world after the 1990s, when it voluntarily sharply reduced its presence in the Arab markets, not considering them promising in the context of the then-established belief that"the West will help us". This illusion lasted for a relatively short period in historical terms, but it was enough to significantly undermine the foundations of trade and economic exchange in the Arab direction and miss important events and processes that were taking shape at that time in the world and Arab economic space.

Since the 2000s, a new policy has been underway to bring Russia closer to the Arab world, revive political relations and strengthen them with extensive economic contacts, restore lost positions and, if possible, create a reserve for the future. In the light of this, new programs were adopted, strategies for rapprochement with the most interesting Arab countries were outlined, and performers of potential cooperation projects in various lines from the Russian side were selected. This topic has attracted the attention of the top leadership of Russia, which indicates the seriousness of intentions to revive cooperation with the Arab East - a recognized participant in world relations and an essential geopolitical center containing parts of two giant continents. State visits to a number of countries in the region took place, and many major Russian businessmen, representatives of the management corps and bureaucrats of various levels got acquainted with the Arab East as part of these missions.

The activity of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been intensified, a structure for encouraging direct investment has been formed, and a Russian-Arab Business Council and similar councils with specific Arab countries have been established. During the regular economic forums in St. Petersburg, meetings and discussions are organized with representatives of the Arab business community, exhibitions are held on a systematic basis at various venues in order to stimulate business activity and develop cooperation in various sectors of the economy. In general, the region has received increased attention, which has led to certain shifts and the emergence of results that have materialized in concrete growth figures after many years of actual stagnation of relations in the economic sphere.

But overcoming the inertia of stagnation is hardly possible in a short period of time. This concerns reaching acceptable positions in strategic areas of cooperation with the Arabs: in the oil-producing complex, in large-scale infrastructure construction, in the investment and financial sector, and in military-technical cooperation. It was in these areas that a solid experience of joint activities in serious niches was previously obtained, which consolidated mutual trust and opened up additional ways to cooperate.

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Today, the fundamental tasks of expanding contacts with the Arabs are not easily solved, which is due to the activities of foreign capital covering various aspects of its functioning in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Almost all the subjects of world economic relations, the United States, Europe, and China, show increased activity in the Arab world, which is clearly focused on promoting their national interests in the Maghreb and Mashriq and on supporting their monopolies. Against this background, the return of Russia is complicated by the fact that it has largely lost the groundwork created earlier, having lost its former economic and political assets.

Nevertheless, before the events of the Arab Spring, large Russian capital still showed a desire to correct the situation. However, it did not come out of the swing mode due to a serious shortage of funds necessary for the successful development of favorable points in the Arab economic space. The complex circumstances of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s affected the intentions of the Russian side, forcing it to temporarily weaken its interest in the Arab markets. After all, working within our own borders often turned out to be more profitable for domestic large-scale capital than foreign projects.

In addition, due to the political miscalculations of the 1990s, Russia lost reliable partners who lost access to the necessary working capital and material resources. This has weakened their ability to meet their part of the obligations. This situation did not pass without a trace, affecting the development of the entire range of relations between the Russian Federation and specific Arab states.

After the expansion of the "Arab spring" zone, the effect of Russia's economic activity decreased even more, because Libya and Syria fell out of the cage of its traditional partners. Even earlier, this happened with Iraq, and before that with Egypt - those Arab states that were politically attracted to Russia in different periods of modern times. Already at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the company's ability to operate in the region turned out to be seriously limited geographically where, under other circumstances, permanent cooperation could be really profitable in rather extensive niches.

It seems that there are no immediate breakthroughs on the Middle East economic front, and the whole situation for Russia may take a protracted character, despite the recent unblocking of relations with Egypt. In any case, it is unlikely to improve in the near future, both for these reasons and because of Western sanctions imposed with the aim of causing maximum damage to Russia's internal economic situation and destabilizing the political situation in it.

This is one part of the question. Another is that if the sanctions measures are delayed, they can also provoke a certain deterioration in the indicators of Russia's foreign economic activity, including in the Arab direction. Narrowing, and even more so the loss of the ability to regularly get loans in the West (despite the fact that there is a need to throw all your efforts at diversifying domestic production and creating an import substitution base) In one way or another, it leads to an overflow of budget funds and affects the reproduction capabilities of various branches of Russian industry, including those operating on foreign markets.

Naturally, the West is not the only source of borrowed funds. There are also financial centers in other parts of the world, such as in Southeast Asia (SE). The role of BRICS as a financial and economic stabilizer is increasing. However, the problem of free capital also exists here, and it is not yet clear how quickly and on what scale it could be mobilized.

Russia has entered a very difficult period, the tension of which will probably not ease soon. In addition, it did not come at the best times of its recent history.

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stories that bear the imprint of the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the vicissitudes of the transition to a market system of economic organization. The uncertainty that accompanies this transition in many important economic positions and financial indicators produces unfavorable Western ratings, which are designed to emphasize the extent to which Russia's economic viability is falling at the current stage.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that an unfortunate turn of events for Russia, given the country's huge resources and its mobilization potential, would be absolutely disastrous for its productive forces as the basis for quickly overcoming the difficulties that have arisen.

So far, there is no information describing the current dynamics of foreign economic activity at the Russian and Arab poles. Only indirect evidence suggests that exchange compression can become a reality, although it is difficult to predict what the contours of interaction will be even in the near future. So far, it is known that the preliminary damage caused by sanctions caused Russia, according to some unofficial, but voiced at a fairly high level, damage in the amount of $ 50 billion. The losses of the conflicting Arab states are estimated at much higher figures, many times higher than the losses of Russia. All this does not contribute to the rapid development of Russian-Arab cooperation, especially since the data are far from final and may not be adjusted for the better. Although it is difficult to assume that this cooperation may dry up even with a more undesirable turn of events.

Be that as it may, the practice of the past decade and a half has shown that Russia and Arab states of different economic affluence and socio-political development can easily find different points of market communication and act on the basis of mutual benefit. For example, in Russia there are "Mother's Care", "Body Shop" and "Starbucks" stores opened on the basis of franchising by the Kuwaiti entrepreneur M. Shay [http://oodrin.ru/?p=1476 In 2012, the Russian company ECOS won a tender in Saudi Arabia for the construction of a wastewater treatment plant in Riyadh [http://www.ecos.ru/project/item_1605.php].

At the same time, the Russian company Metalloinvest invested $ 150 million in the construction of a plant in the UAE for the production of rebar products with a capacity of 1 million tons per year, which was commissioned in 2010. In the same year, the company signed an agreement with the United Arab Emirates to build a direct reduction iron production facility at a cost of $ 320 million. [http://www.metalinfo.ru/ru/news/42223]. In 2012, Rosatom signed a contract with the UAE for the supply of fuel for the Barak nuclear power plant, while Technoexport and Canada's Yuranium One, whose majority stake belongs to the Russian side, committed themselves to converting and processing uranium into low-enriched fuel for four Emirati nuclear power plants. In February 2015, during negotiations held at the defense arms exhibition held in the UAE, Russia and the UAE signed a number of agreements, according to which companies from the UAE will invest in the construction of the Central Ring Road in Russia and in a number of projects in the agricultural, oil and gas, telecommunications and other sectors of the Russian economy [IA REGNUM, 24.02.2015]. Economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the UAE would probably develop more rapidly, but they are constrained by the practice of forming companies and enterprises with the participation of a local sponsor, which must own 51% of the capital of joint ventures, which is mandatory for foreign capital in the UAE. Therefore, Russian entrepreneurs prefer to register their business in the free zones of the UAE, where these restrictions do not apply. However, the products of enterprises located in such zones do not have the right of access to the domestic market of the country.

In the current global and regional reality with its increased mobility, conflicting interests, political and economic pressure,

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unfair competition, etc. it is difficult not only to develop criteria for business communication. It is also difficult to take into account the multiple nuances of the functioning of international business in its regional format, adapt to the specific conditions of rapidly changing local raw materials, commodity, and financial markets, feel the situation and navigate the specifics of the structure of national business systems and institutions, which are usually wary of strangers and able to act informally.

The list of difficulties and bottlenecks is not limited to the listed circumstances, which, along with many others, act as a common reality for all subjects of foreign economic activity. But understanding the universality of factors present in different combinations in any market does not exclude the presence in specific cases of details that indicate the specificity of Eastern business structures and too flexible rules according to which their practice is formed and their interests are implemented. Deviations can affect rapprochement processes, especially if there are unintended techniques, additional requirements, or other measures taken to gain a one-sided advantage, although more often they happen to a new, inexperienced partner who is unfamiliar with local rules.

But the free use of contracts is not a typical practice, since Arab businesses themselves are interested in transparency of transactions and have centuries of experience in market communication, in which a word can mean more than a signed contract. In the Arab East, there is an understanding of the need for effective cooperation, optimization of its financial support, improvement of technical parameters of work and reduction of project costs, which best guarantees the effectiveness of projects.

Naturally, the prerequisites for successful actions in the field of foreign economic activity are created not so much on its external sites, but on internal borders and largely depend on the situation in the economy, its macroeconomic indicators, the state of the main balance sheets, the stability of which also contributes to stability in international trade and economic relations. Nevertheless, the full functioning of the Russian economy (albeit at a "low speed"), even in unfavorable conditions, requires maintaining working conditions in various sectors of the economy, including in the field of international economic cooperation. With regard to the Arab world, this is especially important to take into account, even though Russia's partners in the Arab East have now lost a significant part of their economic capacity and are more concerned not so much with the problems of creation as with the tasks of survival.

The Russian economy is also facing a difficult situation, the possibility of production contraction is being outlined, and the emergence of crisis phenomena as such is not excluded. In such circumstances, a number of development programs may be reduced, and the issues of advancing the growth of institutions of a new technological order may be postponed for a while. But the potential that served the needs of cooperation with the Arab world has not been completely lost, and this gives a chance to continue economic ties with it in the future.

If these cross-cutting factors are calculated and corrected to the extent possible, then even then, despite the obvious difficulties, foreign economic activity can eventually have an effect. Especially when such a topic as cooperation during the recovery period comes up in full force. Participation in this process, by definition, promises a large volume of orders and work. And if you manage to get solid contracts for the supply of equipment and contract work in key industries, then success will result not only in creating additional jobs in Russia itself, but also require it to train personnel for expanding production in this way, at least locally.

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In any case, it should be taken into account that the current devastation in half of the Arab world is not eternal, the time will come for the post-war recovery of its economy, and this circumstance should attract the attention of Russian business of any rank in advance.

It seems quite useful to be far-sighted about the future goals that Russia must necessarily be interested in in the Arab East. Information is already leaking out that, for example, the United States, having fully mastered the dilapidated Iraq, is looking for approaches to participate in the post-war economic reconstruction of Syria, despite its outright hostility to this country and its regime, and is groping for ways to gain a foothold in other Arab platforms, pragmatically guided not so much by political as by economic considerations. Perhaps Russia should also start looking at options for participating in the reconstruction processes in Arab countries right now.

The scale of work here is seen as very serious. It will be necessary to deploy not only civil construction, but also to recreate the real sector at a modern level using new technologies and methods of production activities. Probably, not all aspects of participation in the economic revival of the Arab world will be equally accessible to Russia. But it is able to cooperate quite widely with interested partners in many areas.

In addition to traditional oil and gas, this includes agriculture, including land development, irrigation construction, agricultural technologies and methods for increasing crop yields. This is water management, which remains an extremely relevant topic for Arab countries with a medium level of development and is associated with the extraction, purification, and supply of water resources. This is industry, including mining, processing and processing of agricultural products. These are transport and other types of infrastructure, including energy, the needs of which were quite acute even in pre-war Mashriq, and after all these events will clearly form one of the main priorities in its development programs. It should be noted that Russia, despite all the economic difficulties listed above, in 2014-2015 announced its intention to consolidate efforts for further development of economic cooperation with a number of Arab countries.

For example, in 2014, an agreement was signed with Jordan on the construction of the kingdom's first nuclear power plant, with the help of which it will be possible to receive up to 40% of the electricity it needs [Lenta.ru, 25.12.2014], and in early 2015 - with Egypt on the construction of a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 1-1.2 thousand megawatts in the Alexandria area. In addition, an agreement on the creation of a free zone between Egypt and the Eurasian Union was signed [RIA Novosti, 10.02.2015], which may indicate that Russian-Egyptian cooperation has reached a new, higher level, this time within the framework of multilateral cooperation.

In other words, Russian business feels the strength to participate in the expansion of national Arab economies of various scales. But it needs to be brought to the starting positions mobilized and ready for action on a broad front, where there is a large choice for applying capital. This is necessary to ensure access to Russian business facilities at various levels. Meanwhile, Russia has historically been committed to gross approaches based on scope and corresponding results. Sometimes it overlooks some of the subtleties that make it possible not only to facilitate the conduct of frontal economic operations, but also to attract small businesses to participate in them. Therefore, it seems appropriate that Russia, following the example of the West, should combine the movement of large public and private businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, in one direction and

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it acted purposefully in its own geo-economic and geopolitical interests.

In the current environment, penetration of foreign markets by state-owned corporations or large equity firms alone can no longer be the only way to ensure a breakthrough. In any case, even if the strategy of relying on the capabilities of consolidated companies with state participation remains the same, it must necessarily be supported by a capable private enterprise for the benefit of the business. This creates a mass effect of the phenomenon, rather than a point presence in the face of Russian commodity monopolies or industrial companies.

The entire structure of interaction with Arab capital should be built up right now. It should be consistently implemented not only in serious projects, but also in small and medium-sized individual enterprises and constantly tested to identify shortcomings and bottlenecks that arise in the course of practice. This is a generally accepted approach, and, apparently, only with it can the funds invested in the development of Russian business abroad be justified.

Meanwhile, in recent Russia, economic policy has not particularly favored small business, which, playing a relatively inconspicuous role at home, could not even think about entering a broader path, especially abroad. Now circumstances are pushing to correct the situation with private business in Russia and give more independence and space to small and medium-sized capital, as was the case, for example, in France in the early 1970s. By relying on such enterprises, it managed to reverse the negative trend in the development of the national economy and regain the position befitting a great power.

Russia has reached a certain point where it may be useful to turn to the policy of direct incentives for small businesses and expanding ties with Arab countries in the format of cooperation in this category of capital, but at a qualitatively different level. To achieve this, it is necessary to mobilize the abilities of that part of the amateur population, which it demonstrated in the recent past, when in the new Russia, in the absence of a national commodity mass, market replenishment was carried out almost exclusively by individual Russian merchants. They managed to quickly occupy a significant niche in Arab commerce in a short time. Then, in the 1990s, up to $ 5 billion a year was pumped through the channels of "suitcase trade" to Arab merchants.

The higher stage began after the potentials of this category of private foreign trade were exhausted. A new phase (although for obvious reasons much smaller in terms of turnover) was initiated by individual private Russian entrepreneurs and firms that have established themselves in the field of computer services, logistics, transport, and some other activities that are of auxiliary importance (consulting services, for example). Mastering these areas is an ordinary technique of penetration and placement in a foreign market. It is reproduced daily by the West in the same Arab states, although the tilt is made towards a more prosperous Arab business, which the Russian "amateur" capital has much less opportunities and forces to break through to than the other one, which has long been entrenched in the Arab spaces.

Potentially, the Russian private business could already create its own footholds at least in the Arab innovation environment and diversify the opportunities for approval in parallel directions on a joint basis. In this case, it takes more ingenuity and mobility to achieve positive results, i.e. to fit firmly into the environment. The main thing is that it can

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act quickly, bypassing the procedures required for the world of fundamental transactions. It could find partners more quickly, offer its products or conduct joint developments, and vary its savings more freely, acquiring features that appeal to Arab capital of the same caliber. No wonder there is an Arabic proverb, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that in the market you can not trample in the back rows, i.e. you should make your way forward, because the matter does not tolerate delay.

Russian high-tech entrepreneurs have become pioneers of this kind. This topic is of interest to Arab counterparts who themselves create small businesses for innovative developments and start-up projects, as well as the development and promotion of information and communication technologies. Their participants are intelligent, better prepared for international communication and are able to find a common language more easily. In addition, cooperation in this area seems equally promising in almost the entire field of the Arab East. New directions are now being activated and opening up niches both in the capital-surplus countries of the region and in the capital-deficient ones.

It would be useful to take advantage of the situation and encourage the commercial interest of the relevant segment of the business community in the center and in the field in operations abroad. After all, in the overwhelming majority, it does not have access to foreign markets, does not have the necessary experience, but with the help and guarantees of regional authorities, in general, the state that orients its institutions to support it, it could take part in foreign economic activity. This is a normal policy, but there is a high probability that an instant result will not be obtained. There are objective reasons for this, not to mention multiple subjective factors.

The approval of medium and small Russian capital within Arab borders in a broader format will hardly be easier than for large domestic ones. To achieve a result, it must meet a number of serious requirements. These include appropriate financial and technical support for foreign economic activity. It is extremely important to understand the principles of economic mechanisms in the Arab environment. Here, some niches may be regulated not only by modern legislation, but also by certain provisions of Sharia law or trade traditions of the area. This is not a general rule, but cases of a local slide to such a format of relations cannot be excluded, given the current elements of the archaization of industrial relations in the context of the weakening of the central government and trends towards fragmentation of domestic markets in some segments of the Arab world. This requires knowledge of the psychology of local business, the ability to navigate the local market, the presence of other skills, in particular the ability to act confidently in a different civilizational environment. Without adapting to unfamiliar conditions and without personal contacts, the results will clearly be limited. This entails a significant risk of losing the business or running it with low efficiency.

Nevertheless, even without state support, there are already successful examples of individual Russian high-tech private structures entering the Arab markets, for example, in the UAE, which are very willing to accept foreign pioneer firms on their territory. This fact quickly attracted the attention of a number of Russian entrepreneurs, some of whom practically left the developed areas in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia or Syria due to the events of the "Arab Spring". Already at the beginning of 2014, more than 300 Russian-Emirati enterprises in trade, hotel business, tourism and cargo transportation were operating in the UAE. About 100 Russian companies of a different profile were registered in the free zones of the UAE [http://www.economy.gov.ru/, 22.04.14]. Among them there is a branch of a well-known company in Russia

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Kaspersky firms, as well as a number of others involved in operations with high-tech products.

Naturally, one should not exaggerate the size of the phenomenon, but its significance for Russia is great in the sense that it points the way to similar entities that are creative, arise from the youth student environment, work on the implementation of unusual projects and the creation of innovative products. First of all, they can use their potential to develop business contacts with their peers in Arab countries who are involved in such activities. They only need to point the way and help at least at first with the means that are effective for promoting any business.

All this is achievable and realistic for Russia, especially since there are still some favorable circumstances of a humanitarian and economic nature.

If we assume that at least a part of the Arab business community has a historical memory, then perhaps the process of restoring contacts will be somewhat simplified. But to do this, you need to support or directly stimulate the interest of specific business people who, even during the almost complete collapse of Soviet-Arab trade and economic relations, tried to establish business contacts in Moscow and looked for business partners in other cities of Russia. Even now, there are enthusiasts among them who support trade operations, for example, with Syria, overcoming the seemingly unthinkable difficulties of the current military situation in this country and the sanctions state of the Russian economy. Their continued activity in unfavorable circumstances indicates the high viability of individual entrepreneurship and the fact that small capital can not only find opportunities for cooperation, but also support it in various areas.

The revival of small Russian businesses requires informal measures, which is not typical of bureaucratic apparatuses. These measures are clearly easier to implement through small, flexible enthusiast firms. It is more convenient for them, for example, to develop the above-mentioned topic of business contacts with Arab entrepreneurs working in Russia. Many of the latter are Russian residents involved in various forms of business. They have serious skills in foreign economic activity and relations in the Arab world, are aware of the specifics of interaction with Arab capital, and are unlikely to refuse to expand their participation in the sphere close to them. We should not exclude the possibility of attracting Arab businessmen who have their own business in third countries, but can join forces with Russian capital if they see an entrepreneurial interest in this.

It is highly desirable that Russian entrepreneurs do not act at their own risk. They must be protected by the State and be aware of the Power behind them. This is especially important due to the fact that cases of unfair competition and other conflicts are not excluded. This has often happened in various Arab countries in the post-Soviet period, and incidents cannot be ruled out in the future.

In the light of the above, it would be timely to popularize the idea of foreign economic cooperation in the business environment itself. There are, as noted, institutions designed to work with economic entities at the federal and regional levels. Small businesses seem to fall out of their sphere of activity. But at the same time, it requires a special, informal approach, which can only be provided within the framework of increased attention to it. Without this, the potential of small businesses will not have prospects for entering foreign markets, including Arab ones, although this area of foreign economic activity is quite promising, as both Arab and foreign experience indicates.

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The Arab direction of foreign economic activity is considered strategic in Russia for a number of reasons. This interpretation has a solid foundation in the form of a long history of economic cooperation with a fairly large group of countries in the region. However, in order to properly assess the benefits of trade and economic cooperation, it is necessary to make adjustments to the current situation in the world, in the region, and in Russia itself. This is already a set of new tasks that the traditional "steamroller" strategy is not suitable for solving, but rather a subtle and calculated tactic of implanting and consolidating Russian interests in the Arab business environment is needed.

Now the situation in the world is such that the previous methods of work are almost completely replaced from foreign economic use. But the activities of the current Russian capital could be facilitated by at least a few circumstances that somehow remain from that era. This is the presence in a number of Arab economies of the most necessary industries and industries that have not received acceptable development in their time and practically only indicate the directions of economic work, since they do not have the appropriate material and technical base and support. They remain open for technical and economic cooperation with any partner of any form of ownership and level, including the Russian one. But the latter has certain advantages, which consist in the fact that it is not always advisable for the Arab economy to purchase the latest equipment. It is not for nothing that firms are working in the West that are engaged in restoring production equipment that has worked out in the Western economy specifically for the Arab markets. At the same time, Arab merchants understand that instead of restoring the old one with a minimum guarantee of performance, it is better to buy new equipment of the same performance. Such at an affordable price can most likely be offered by Russia. From this point of view, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and Syria can be considered quite promising.

Of course, the current circumstances in the last three inspire very little optimism. Indeed, the production process in a number of Arab states is decaying for objective reasons, and the technological park is worn out and directly destroyed physically during combat operations. This fact should not escape the attention of Russian departments and enterprises interested in the development of foreign economic activity. After all, at the first glimpse of the situation, the willingness to offer what you are looking for can provide enterprising merchants with competitive advantages. In addition, in the conditions of a fierce struggle for markets, Russia can no longer afford to work only on the main directions of foreign economic activity. Moreover, interest in this market is spurred by the continuing low "technical level of the nation", characteristic of most Arab countries, and their predisposition to use medium-tech products, intermediate technology products, which the Soviet Union has proven to be a serviceable supplier and which is still produced in one or another quantity in the Russian hinterland.

To some extent, the accumulated sympathy for the image of Russia in different parts of the Arab world may also play a role. Although we have to take into account that this potential is irreversibly reduced due to the change of generations and the departure from active political and economic activities of large masses of local specialists and managers who received education and training back in Soviet times and shared socialist ideas.

Promoting Russian economic initiatives, even in those parts of the Arab East where the situation is potentially favorable, is likely to be a costly undertaking. However, with a rational approach, the political and economic benefits can eventually cover the costs incurred in connection with implementation in a particular country. That the results may be positive.

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This is evidenced at least by the growing activity of businesses in such a troubled state as Sudan, even from the African and Middle Eastern states themselves, which are inferior to Russia in terms of economic and resource potential, but consider it necessary to settle in the Sudanese borders in the expectation of future dividends. Moreover, it is not necessary to talk about the PRC and Western countries, which are well aware of the potential capabilities of Sudan and the prospects of other Arab states and are trying to consolidate their presence in them. It is probably desirable for Russia to adopt such a tactic in order to equalize its capabilities with those competitors who have already gained positions in almost all parts of the Arab region.

When planning a business offensive in the Middle East, it is necessary to understand that a significant part of it is now in a state of exceptional military tension. And in a very economically promising area, made up of countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Syria, where there are or are seen significant reserves of energy resources, as well as Jordan and Lebanon, which have not so developed real sector, but have considerable recreational opportunities that can also be developed.

But just knowing how to approach the topic of resuming Russian-Arab economic cooperation will not provide the key to success. Even an understanding of the difficulties hindering the expansion of Russia's presence in the Arab economic and political space will only allow us to create an outline of the promotion of Russian entrepreneurship in this area of the world market.

In fact, in the long run, if Russia is able to combine the economic capabilities of the state and the capabilities of the entrepreneurial class in a single market channel, a completely new practice is waiting for Russia. Regarding the state capital, the picture is clear: it is in standby mode. Individual entrepreneurship is much more mobile, and this is confirmed by the data presented above, when a group of individuals was able to successfully meet consumer demand in Russia for a long time. This proves that the ingenuity and activity of ordinary Russian business entities are sufficient to achieve success in various niches, especially with the support of the state.

The innovation sector is particularly promising, but other niches in the Persian Gulf countries are not closed to Russians. Less opportunities are provided by the market of less prosperous countries of the Arab East, which the Russian consciousness has historically focused on. It was in a state of collapse, but even before that it was not structured, unlike the markets created in the Western likeness in the Persian Gulf zone. Like the Russian market, it did not enter into external contacts independently, with the exception of isolated, purely commercial transactions and with small batches of consumer goods.

Guaranteed penetration into the number of economic entities in the Arab world and the return on such a complex project can only be achieved by using modern and state-backed methods of market conquest. But this requires an appropriately designed toolkit. It should concentrate all the experience accumulated in Russia of business partnership with foreign countries and take into account the methods of penetration into the Arab markets of industrial powers. This is the main task of the current stage in the evolution of Russian entrepreneurship into a competitive business community with extensive external relations in the Arab world and beyond.

In this case, the implementation of a consolidated project that combines the power of the state and the mobility of private management will allow Russia in the future to gain not only valuable trade and economic partners in the Maghreb and Mashriq, but also to prepare a strategic springboard for extending its foreign policy and foreign economic initiative to adjacent regions and countries.

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http://www.metalinfo.ru/ru/news/42223 (accessed: 08.04.2014).

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